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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Shane Crawford appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts and proceedings of Crawford's conviction for lewd and lascivious 
conduct, and his direct appeal, are described by the district court as follows: 
In 2010, the State charged Crawford with two counts of Lewd 
Conduct With A Minor Under The Age Of Sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508, 
identified as Count I and Count II. The State also charged Crawford with 
two counts of Sexual Abuse Of A Child Under The Age Of Sixteen (Counts 
Ill and IV). The victim in Count I was Victim I, A.C., and the victim in the 
remaining counts was Victim II, A.c.r11 The victims came forward while 
Crawford was on a retained jurisdiction for a conviction for Lewd and 
Lascivious with an unrelated victim. Victim I was his biological daughter 
and Victim II was his step-daughter. However, Crawford was the only 
father she had ever known. 
A jury found Crawford guilty on Count I and Count II and acquitted 
Crawford on the two remaining counts. The Court imposed concurrent 
unified terms of twenty-five (25) years, with minimum periods of 
confinement of six (6) years, for each count. Crawford appealed and 
argued, among other things, that the Court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury, in response to a jury question, that the breast area was not a genital 
for the purpose of finding Crawford guilty of lewd conduct pursuant to I.C. 
§ 18-1508, as to both Count I and Count 11. The Court of Appeals ruled in 
an unpublished decision that the Court did err and that as to Count I, the 
error was not harmless. The appellate court reversed Crawford's 
conviction on Count I and remanded it for retrial. The appellate court, 
however, found that any error was harmless as it applied to Count II and 
affirmed the jury conviction. 
On remand, the State dismissed Count I and chose not to pursue a 
new trial. 
1 The state will refer to Victim II as "An.C." 
1 
(R., p.324.) 
Crawford filed a post-conviction petition, claiming his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by (1) failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting Count II -- lewd conduct against An.C., (2) failing to request the court to 
answer "yes" to the jury's question of whether, "[i]n order to have committed manual-
genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area?" (and failing to preserve the 
issue for appeal), and (3) failing to request the court to define "genital" for the jury (and 
failing to preserve the issue for appeal). (R., p.9.) Crawford also claimed his counsel 
on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
convict him on Count II because there "were not stronger issues to raise on appeal." 
(R., p.10.) 
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.278-280) and an answer 
and brief in support of its motion (R., pp.266-277), contending Crawford failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to relief. Crawford, through 
counsel, filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition (R., pp.281-282) and a 
memorandum opposing the state's motion for summary dismissal and supporting his 
motion for summary disposition (R., pp.283-297). The state responded by filing a 
memorandum opposing Crawford's Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition (R., pp.297-
305), and Crawford filed a reply (R., pp.306-322). 
After hearing argument on both parties' motions, the district court issued an 
Order Granting Summary Dismissal to the State. (R., pp.323-335.) The court 
subsequently entered a Final Judgment dismissing Crawford's post-conviction petition 
with prejudice (R., pp.337-338), and Crawford filed a timely appeal (R., pp.339-342). 
2 
ISSUES 
Crawford states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the trial court err in finding trial and appellate counsels' 
performances were not deficient because there was sufficient evidence in 
the trial record to support the conviction on Count II? If so, was the error 
prejudicial? 
B. Did the trial court misapply the Court of Appeals' opinion in Mintun v. 
State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2007), when dismissing the 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, as the sufficiency of the 
evidence claim was the strongest issue which could have been raised with 
regard to Count II? 
C. Did the trial court err in finding that trial counsel's failure to request an 
affirmative answer to the jury's inquiry or to request the court to define the 
word "genitalia" was not deficient performance? If so, was the error 
prejudicial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Crawford Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of 
His Post-Conviction Claims 
A. Introduction 
Crawford contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims 
that: (1) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count II, (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to present the strongest issue on appeal -- the "sufficiency of the evidence" 
issue, and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an affirmative answer 
to the jury's inquiry of whether manual-to-genital contact requires touching the "vaginal 
area," and for failing to ask the court to define the term "genital." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.7-19.) 
A review of the record shows Crawford has failed to demonstrate any error in the 
district court's conclusion that he failed to meet his burden of establishing a genuine 
issue of material fact relative to any of his post-conviction claims. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists 
which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. Nellsch v. 
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P .2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court freely reviews 
the district court's application of the law. kl at 434, 835 P.2d at 669. However, the 
Court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
4 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
C. Applicable Legal Standards 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss a post-
conviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears there is "no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In order to 
survive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present evidence in 
support of his petition sufficient to make "a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v. 
State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Furthermore, the factual showing 
in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence that would be 
admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 
546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999). While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court 
is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 
Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 
P .2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). In other words, bare or conclusory allegations, 
unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary 
hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 
159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822,826,702 P.2d 
860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985). 
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In the context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has articulated the applicable standards as follows: 
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to survive a summary dismissal, the 
petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the applicant's case. 
To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to 
show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption 
that trial counsel was competent and diligent. Thus, the claimant has the 
burden of showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance. 
To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable 
probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of 
the proceeding would have been different. Trial counsel's strategic or 
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those 
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-154, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008) (internal 
citations omitted). 
D. Crawford Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal 
Of His Post-Conviction Claims 
Crawford's argument that the district court erred in granting the state's motion for 
summary dismissal is completely rebutted by the district court's "Order Granting 
Summary Dismissal To The State," attached as Appendix A, which is incorporated into 
this Respondent's Brief and relied upon as if fully set forth herein. In addition to the 
district court's reasoning, the state makes the following argument with regard to 
Crawford's claim that his trial counsel and direct appeal counsel provided ineffective 
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assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
conviction on Count II, lewd conduct against An.C. 
Count II alleged that Crawford committed lewd conduct upon An.C. by having 
manual-to-genital contact with her in the kitchen after asking her questions about her 
"clit."2 (R., pp.226, 229 (Tr., p.498, Ls.6-19; p.512, Ls.5-9).) Crawford's "sufficiency" 
arguments are based on An.C.'s response to the prosecutor's question of where 
Crawford's hands touched her during that incident. An.C. answered: "Outside of my 
vaginal area." (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-14; R., p.162 (Tr., p.242, Ls.3-11; p.243, Ls.13-
16).) Crawford contends An.C.'s testimony that the contact was "outside" the "vaginal 
area" means he did not have contact with her genitalia. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-14.) 
Based on that premise, Crawford argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction for lewd conduct under Count II, and the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his related claims that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a 
motion for judgment of acquittal in regard to Count II under I.C.R. 29, and (2) counsel on 
direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim as to 
Count II. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-11.) Crawford's claims fail. 
During An.C.'s testimony, the prosecutor asked questions showing the 
progressive pattern of Crawford's touching of her body. An.C. initially said that 
Crawford "would touch [her] on [her] upper thigh and it started getting really 
uncomfortable.'' (R., p.161 (Tr., p.238, L.19 - p.239, L.7).) An.C. further explained that 
2 While in the kitchen with An.C., Crawford asked her if she knew what a "clit" was and 
she told him she did not. (R., p.162 (Tr., p.242, Ls.16-18).) Crawford responded, "Well, 
let me show you," and as An.C. backed away, he "went to go show [her]," and he 
touched her "[o]utside of [her] vaginal area" by using his hands to go up her shorts. (R., 
p.162 (Tr., p. 243, Ls.10-19).) 
7 
Crawford touched "[c)lose to my private area[,]" which made her uncomfortable. (R., 
p.161 (Tr., p.239, Ls.17-23).) An.C. said that when she told her grandmother about the 
touching, her grandmother said "that it was how [Crawford] shows his affection and to 
not pay any attention to it." (R., p.161 (Tr., p.240, Ls.1-5).) An.C. finally told her mother 
that Crawford had been touching her because her mother "was having second thoughts 
about divorcing him and [An.C.] told her she needs to." (R., p.161 (Tr., p.241, Ls.17-
19).) At that point in An.C.'s testimony, the prosecutor advanced beyond the subject of 
Crawford touching An.C.'s thighs to introduce a more serious level of contact --
Crawford's touching of An.C.'s "privates:" 
[Prosecutor]: Okay. And so let's go back to the touching. Besides the 
touching when he was rubbing on your leg, was he getting close to where 
your underwear was at? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, was he up there to your privates? 
A. Yes. 
(R., pp.161-162 (Tr., p.241, L.20 - p.242, L.2) (emphasis added).) Both the prosecutor's 
questions and An.C.'s answers about Crawford touching her "up there to [her] privates" 
were made without any specific reference to a particular incident. However, it is logical 
to conclude that such testimony referred to the kitchen incident discussed immediately 
thereafter. 
Prior to testifying that Crawford was "up there to [her] privates[,]" An.C. testified 
that he made her uncomfortable by touching her upper thigh "[c]lose to [her) private 
area.'' (R., p.161 (Tr., p.239, Ls.3-20).) Immediately after An.C. testified that Crawford 
touched her "up there to [her] privates[,)" the prosecutor asked, "And so do you 
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remember a time when you were in the kitchen with your dad?" (R., p.162 (Tr., p.242, 
Ls.2-3).) An.C. then testified about the kitchen incident.3 While in the kitchen, Crawford 
offered An.C. an alcoholic drink, but she refused. (R., p.162 (Tr., p.242, Ls.14-15).) 
Crawford asked An.C. if she knew what a "clit" was and she told him she did not. (R., 
p.162 (Tr., p.242, Ls.16-18).) Crawford then said, "Well, let me show you," and as 
An.C. backed away, Crawford "went to go show [her]," and he touched her "[o]utside of 
[her] vaginal area" by using his hands to go up her shorts. (R., p.162 (Tr., p. 243, Ls.10-
19).) 
Apart from the TV incident, see n. 2, supra, An.C.'s testimony about the kitchen 
incident is the only other incident that matches An.C.'s initial testimony that Crawford 
touched her "up there to [her] privates[.]" (See R., pp.161-162 (Tr., p.241, L.25 - p.242, 
L.2).) Therefore, a rational juror could have easily concluded that An.C. testified, in 
effect, that the kitchen incident was one of the times Crawford touched her "up there to 
[her] privates." Upon hearing such testimony, a rational juror could also have 
reasonably concluded that Crawford had engaged in manual-to genital contact with 
An.C. during the kitchen incident. 
With regard to Crawford's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct 
appeal, he argues that the district court "misapplied the rule in Mintun v. State, that 'only 
3 After testifying about the kitchen incident, An.C. testified only about one other incident 
that can reasonably be viewed as involving her "privates." She explained that when she 
was living at the Summer Field house and watching TV with Crawford, she had to 
"remove his hand from around [her] vaginal area or from near [her] vaginal area." (R., 
pp.162-163 (Tr., p.243, Ls.13-16; p.244, L.17 - p.246, L.14).) The remaining incidents 
that An.C. testified about do not involve contact near An.C.'s genitals -- Crawford's 
exposure of his penis to her at Christmas time in 2008 (R., pp.163-164 (Tr., p.248, L.24 
- p.251, L.11)), and his grabbing her breast in front of a friend during a UFC party (R., 
p.164 (Tr., p.251, L.12-p.253, L.11)). 
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when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of 
effective assistance of counsel be overcome."' (Appellant's Brief, p.15; Mintun v. State, 
144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 
U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (ih Cir., 1986))).) 
Crawford asserts that the district court "took this rule to mean that since '[a]ppellate 
counsel raised the strongest issue on appeal -- that the Court erred as a matter of law in 
instructing the jury,' counsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise other meritorious 
issues." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The court did no such thing. 
In Robbins, the Supreme Court parenthetically quoted Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d at 
646, for the general proposition that "'only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than 
those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome."' 
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288. However, Gray explains that there is more to the analysis 
than simply gauging whether the "ignored issues are clearly stronger than those 
presented." See id. Gray made clear that, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on appeal, the ignored issue must be "a significant and obvious issue," not 
merely stronger than those presented, and the failure to raise it must be prejudicial: 
Had appellate counsel failed to raise a significant and obvious issue, the 
failure could be viewed as deficient performance. If an issue which was 
not raised may have resulted in a reversal of the conviction, or an order for 
a new trial, the failure was prejudicial. . . . When a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is based on failure to raise viable issues, the district 
court must examine the trial court record to determine whether appellate 
counsel failed to present significant and obvious issues on appeal. 
Significant issues which could have been raised should then be compared 
to those which were raised. Generally, only when ignored issues are 
clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective 
assistance of counsel be overcome. 
Gray, 800 F.2d at 646 (emphasis added). 
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Here, although the district court stated that Crawford's counsel presented the 
strongest issue on direct appeal -- failure to instruct the jury that breasts are not genitals 
(R., pp.334-335) -- it did not rule that appellate counsel "could not be ineffective for 
failing to raise other meritorious issues[,]" thereby implying that Crawford's "sufficiency" 
issue was meritorious.4 (See Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Rather, the court ruled that 
Crawford's "sufficiency" based claim was not meritorious, stating, "the evidence gave 
rise to reasonable inferences of guilt on Count II. Thus, appellate counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to pursue this issue on appeal." (R., pp.334-335.) 
Moreover, courts must also determine whether there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the petitioner would have prevailed on 
appeal. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285. Even assuming Crawford's sufficiency claim was not 
frivolous, the evidence presented at trial was, as the district court concluded, sufficient 
to support his conviction for lewd conduct. Accordingly, Crawford has failed to show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the direct appeal would 
have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 (1984). 
Crawford has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court's summary dismissal of 
that claim. 
Based on the district court's "Order Granting Summary Dismissal To The State" 
(Appendix A), and the above supplemental argument, Crawford has failed to show any 
error in the district court's summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims. 
4 Crawford argues that the "strongest" issue presented on direct appeal -- the failure to 
inform the jury that breasts are not genitals -- had no relevance to Count II, lewd 
conduct against An.C. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) Regardless, inasmuch as 
Crawford's "sufficiency" issue has no merit, it does not meet either the deficient 
performance prong or prejudice prong of Strickland. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Crawford's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2014. 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-11891 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL TO THE STATE 
On July 2, 2013, the Petitioner, Shane Crawford, filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, alleging ineffective counsel assistance of trial counsel for failing to move for acquittal, 
failing to request the Court define genital and answer "yes" to one of the jury's questions, and 
failing to "preserve" the issue for appeal. Crawford _also complains that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Crawford's 
conviction on Count II. Crawford attached copies of those documents he claimed supported his 
Petition. 
The State answered on July 9, 2013, and moved for summary disposition. Crawford 
opposed and filed a cross motion for summary disposition. 
The Court heard argument on both motions on October 23, 2013, and took the matter 
under advisement on October 28, 2013. 
After reviewing the evidence and pleadings before it, the Court finds that no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings and finds, as a matter of law, that Crawford is entitled 
to none of the post-conviction reliefrequested. Repp v. State, 136 Idaho 262, 32 P.3d 156, 157-58 
(Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, the Court grants the State's motion for summary dismissal and denies 
Crawford's motion for summary disposition. The Court, therefore, dismisses Crawford's Petition. 
The Court further finds that no evidentiary hearing is necessary. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL TO THE STATE 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-11891 . 1 
000323 
1 BACKGROUND 
2 In 2010, the State charged Crawford with two counts of Lewd Conduct With A Minor 
3 Under The Age Of Sixteen, LC. § 18-1508, identified as Count I and Count II. The State also 
4 charged Crawford with fwo counts of Sexual Abuse Of A Child Under The Age Of Sixteen 
5 (Counts ill and IV). The victim in Count I was Victim I, A.C., and the victim in the remaining 
6 counts was Victim II, A.C. The victims came forward while Crawford was on a retained 
7 jurisdiction for a conviction for Lewd and Lascivious with an unrelated victim. Victim I was his 
























she had ever known. 
A jury found Crawford guilty on Count I and Count II and acquitted Crawford on the two 
remaining counts. The Court imposed concurrent unified terms of twenty-five (25) years, with 
minimum periods of confinement of six ( 6) years, for each count. Crawford appealed and argued, 
among other things, that the Court erred by failing to instruct the jury, in response to a jury 
question, that the breast area was not a genital for the purpose of finding Crawford guilty of lewd 
conduct pursuant to LC. § 18-1508, as to both Count I and Count II. 
The Court of Appeals ruled in an unpublished decision that the Court did err and that as to 
Count I, the error was not harmless. The appellate court reversed Crawford's conviction on Count 
I and remanded it for retrial. The appellate court, however, found that any error was harmless as it 
applied to Count II and affirmed the jury conviction. 
On remand, the State dismissed Count I and chose not to pursue a new trial. Crawford 
filed this Petition. 
ANALYSIS 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. A petition for post-conviction relief 
can be filed at any time within one year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following appeal, whichever is later. LC. § 19-4902. Crawford 
appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled as follows: 
The district court erred by answering the jury's question regarding whether 
touching of the breast area constitutes manual-genital contact pursuant to LC. § 18-
1508 with the instruction to "re-read all the instructions" and by not instructing the 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL TO THE STATE 
































jury that the act of touching a minor's chest area does not fall within those acts 
specifically enumerated in the statute. While such error was harmless with respect 
to Count II, the error was not harmless with respect to Count I. The district court 
did not abuse its discretion by imposing Crawford's sentence for Count II. 
Accordingly, we affirm Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence with 
respect to Count II, but we vacate Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence 
with respect to Count I and remand for a new trial. 
The remittitur was filed August 23, 2012. Thus, Crawford's Petition is timely. 
Idaho Code §19-4906 authorizes disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief 
pursuant to motion of a party. Idaho Code § l 9-4906(c) provides as follows: 
(c) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits 
submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving pru1y is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The State moved for summary dismissal. Crawford opposed and moved the Court for summary 
disposition in his favor. 
Crawford never filed any affidavits creating a dispute of material fact, and he requested no 
evidentiary hearing. However, the Court is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or his conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 
647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 
372 (Ct. App. 1986). An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil 
proceeding, entirely distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 
797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 (2001). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a 
complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, because an application must contain much more 
than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.RC.P. 
8(a)(l). Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 797, 992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. App. 1999). Finally, a 
petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c). 1 
1 !.C.R. 57(c). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
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Thus, the question is whether the application, affidavits and other evidence supporting the 
application allege facts which entitles Crawford to relief. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P .2d 
738, 740 (1998); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816,892 P.2d 488,492 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In this case, the Court summarily dismisses Crawford's Petition based on the arguments 
presented by the State and those made by Crawford and denies his motion for summary 
disposition in his favor. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). When a 
trial court summarily dismisses an application for post-conviction relief based in part on the 
arguments presented by the State, this is sufficient to meet the notice requirements. See Workman 
v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 524, 164 P .3d 798, 804 (2007); see also Buss v. State, 14 7 Idaho 514, 
517, 211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct.App.2009) ("When a district court summarily dismisses a post-
conviction application relying in part on the same grounds presented by the state in its motion for 
summary dismissal, the notice requirement has been met.") 
All of Crawford's claims against either trial counsel or appellate counsel are ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. In order to succeed on a claim of "actual ineffective assistance of 
counsel," Crawford must meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984); State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 
277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). To prevail on these claims, Crawford must demonstrate (1) each 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there was a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692; Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 
(2002); Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. 
However, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide 
range of "professional assistance" and will not be second-guessed on appeal or on post-
conviction. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Moreover, in order 
to survive summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Crawford must establish by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) 
a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a 
material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. See 
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 604, 21 P.3d 924, 926 (2001); Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
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583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000) (citing Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 
(1998)). 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a court does not second-guess 
strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction 
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000). "There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell 
within the wide range of professional assistance." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 
1170, 1185 (1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 
760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)). The Supreme Court has made it clear that the standard is very high. 
'"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.' Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S.----,---- [130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284] (2010). An ineffective-
assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and 
raise issues not presented at trial [or in pretrial proceedings], and so the Strickland 
standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-trial inquiry' 
threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to 
serve. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689-690 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. Even under de novo 
review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. 
Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, 
knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing 
counsel, and with the judge. It is 'all too tempting' to ' second-guess counsel's 
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.' Id., at 689 [I 04 S.Ct. 2052]; see 
also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). 
The question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence 
under 'prevailing professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best practices 
or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
Premo v. Moore,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739-40 (2011). Likewise, in another recent United 
States Supreme Court case, the court emphasized again how deferential a reviewing court should 
be to trial counsel because: 
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and 
forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard 
must be applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial inquiry" threaten the 
integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 
Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Even under de novo review, the 
standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a 
later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of 
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materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, 
and with the judge. It is "all too tempting" to "second-guess counsel's assistance 
after conviction or adverse sentence." Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The question 
is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under 
"prevailing professional norms," not whether it deviated from best practices or 
most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
Harrington v. Richter, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 -788 (2011). 
In other words, it is not sufficient for counsel on post-conviction to merely argue that trial 
counsel conducted the trial differently than post-conviction counsel would have done. It is not 
even good enough to point out that trial counsel committed a mistake in the law or the facts. 
Instead, post-conviction counsel must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant was prejudiced, and that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different but for the deficient performance. 
As the United States Supreme Court observed, judicial scrutiny of trial counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential because it is too easy for a court examining trial counsel's 
defense after that defense has proven to be unsuccessful to conclude that a particular act or 
omission was unreasonable. Cf Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-134, (1982). 
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, 
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim 
of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are 
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional iudgment. The court 
must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts 
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 
In making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's 
function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial 
testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should 
recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance 
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691 (emphasis added). 
The Court finds Crawford fails on all counts. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL TO THE ST ATE 
CASE NO.CV-PC-2013-11891 6 000328 
1 I. Allegations against trial counsel fail. 
2 Crawford makes several claims against trial counsel. He argues that trial counsel should 
3 have moved for acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29. He also complains that trial counsel should have 
4 "preserved" the issue of whether substantial evidence existed to support the conviction of Lewd 
5 and Lascivious on Count II. Finally, he argues that his trial counsel should have requested the 
6 Court to define terms for the jury or answered "yes" in response to its question. Crawford is 
7 simply wrong. 
























Contrary to Crawford's claim, defense counsel is not required to raise every conceivable 
issue. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 765, 760 P.2d at 1181. Where the asserted deficiency on the part of 
counsel consists of a failure to pursue a particular issue, which even if pursued would not have 
afforded a basis for relief, the court will reject any ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.; 
Huck, 124 Idaho at 158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38. 
1. A Rule 29 motion would have failed. 
A Rule 29(a) motion for acquittal will not be granted when the evidence is sufficient to 
sustain a conviction. State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129,131,549 P.2d 639,650 (1979) (overruled on 
other grounds). The test of sufficiency is whether there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support a conviction-the same standard applied in appellate review of convictions. State v. Horn, 
101 Idaho 192,197,610 P.2d 551,556 (1980); State v. Erwin, 98 Idaho 736,740,572 P.2d 170, 
174 (1977). The standard of review for a motion for judgment of acquittal under l.C.R. 29(c) is 
whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 
1069, 1074 (2004). 
"Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to sustain the verdict, this 
court cannot reweigh that evidence or disturb the verdict." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 
644-45, 962 P.2d at 1028-29. "In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal ... 
all reasonable inferences on appeal are taken in favor of the prosecution." 
Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho at 545, 976 P.2d at 471; Grube, 126 Idaho at 386, 883 P.2d 
at 1078. 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679,684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004). 
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While Crawford claims that there was "no" evidence of manual-genital touching to sustain 
a conviction on Count II, he is simply wrong. There was substantial evidence to support the jury's 
verdict and a motion to acquit would have failed. The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly described 
what is necessary to support a jury verdict on appeal and what is meant by "substantial evidence". 
Evidence is substantial if a "reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been prove[n]." State v. 
Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134,135,937 P.2d 960,961 (Ct.App.1997). On appeal from a 
defendant's conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution in determining whether substantial evidence exists. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho at 286, 77 P.3d at 975. We will not substitute our own judgment for that of 
the jury on matters such as the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to 
certain evidence, and "the reasonable iriferences to be drawn from the evidence." 
Id. (quoting State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996)). 
Accordingly, substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is 
solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. State v. Stevens, 93 
Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947-48 (1969); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 
704, 132 P.3d 455, 461 (Ct.App.2005). In fact, even when circumstantial evidence 
could be interpreted consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to 
uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt. 
State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753,757,864 P.2d 199,203 (Ct.App.1993). 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,712,215 P.3d 414,432 (2009) (emphasis added). 
The jury in this case had the opportunity to observe the second victim's demeanor, her 
obvious reluctance to testify or to even describe what had happened to her. She testified that 
Crawford asked her "if she knew what her clit was." She also clearly testified that when she 
responded that she did not know, Crawford said, "Well, let me show you" and approached her in 
an effort to physically show her as she backed away from him. She then testified he touched her 
"outside of her vaginal area." 
Crawford attempts to reinterpret what the victim meant. However, applying ordinary 
meanings, the vagina is an internal organ, It is defined and understood to be "the passage leading 
from the vulva to the womb in women." See OXFORD AMERICAN PAPERBACK DICTIONARY 1027 
(1980). Thus, the external genitalia are "outside" the vaginal area. Outside is defined as "the outer 
side of a surface." Id. at 634. A jury could reasonably understand her testimony to be referencing 
the external genitalia ( or outside the vaginal area) which is what is required under the statute for a 
conviction. Therefore, this testimony, especially combined with the jury's determination of her 
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credibility, is sufficient to sustain the conviction.2 As the Supreme Court recognizes, "even when 
circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be 
sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt." 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432 (citing State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho at 757, 864 P.2d 
at 203). Thus, applying the standard that all inferences should be construed in favor of the State's 
evidence, the Court would have denied a motion to acquit. 
Because a motion to acquit would have failed, Crawford cannot establish either that the 
failure to make the motion fell below an objective standard or that Crawford suffered prejudice 
from that failure. Crawford is denied relief on this ground. 
2. A motion to acquit is not necessary to preserve the sufficiency of the 
evidence for appeal. 
Crawford also complains that by failing to move to acquit, the issue of the sufficiency of 
the evidence was not preserved for appeal. He is wrong. It has long been the law in Idaho that "no 
I.C.R. 29 Motion is required to preserve an appeal based on insufficient evidence." State v. 
Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566,570 (1995), citing State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 889 
P.2d 723 (Ct.App.1994). The purpose of Rule 29 is to test the sufficiency of the evidence against 
a defendant and avoid the risk that a jury may find the defendant guilty when there is not legally 
sufficient evidence. 2A WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ,r 461 (Criminal 3d 
ed.2000), (discussing the similar Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal). In fact, Crawford himselfrecognizes this has long been the law and cites these cases in 
his verified petition at page 10. 
Because, as Crawford recognizes, a·motion to acquit was unnecessary to preserve the issue 
for appeal, Crawford cannot prove either that the failure to make the motion fell below an 
objective standard or that he suffered prejudice from that failure. Crawford is denied relief on this 
ground. 
2 A touching outside the vaginal area through clothing is sufficient; bare skin need not even be touched. State v. 
Madrid, 14 Idaho 200, 205-07, 259 P.2d 1044, 1047-48 (1953). 
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B. The failure to request the Court either define genitals or to answer the jury 
question related to touching the vaginal area "yes" does not support post-
conviction relief. 
Crawford also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request the Court 
either define the term "genital" or to answer the jury's question related to touching the vaginal 
area "yes" in response to their question. The Court disagrees. 
The jury asked several questions during deliberations, including the following question 
relevant to the claim presented by Crawford in his Petition: "In order to have committed manual-
genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area?" In response to that question, the Court 
instructed the jury to re-read the instructions. There is nothing to suggest that this decision was in 
error. 
It has long been the rule in Idaho that ordinary words used in the sense in which they are 
generally understood need not be defined injury instructions. See State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 
589, 261 P.3d 853, 866 (2011); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); 
State v. Gonzales, 92 Idaho 152,158,438 P.2d 897,903 (1968); State v. Caldwell, 140 Idaho 740, 
742, 101 P.3d 233,235 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706, 889 P.2d 729, 735 
(Ct. App. 1994); State v. Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794, 799, 641 P.2d 340, 345 (Ct. App. 1982). It 
is not error to refuse to define ordinary words. Id. The term "genital" is commonly understood and 
requires no further explanation. See e.g. State v. Merrifield, 478 A.2d 1131, 1133 (Me. 1984). 
Therefore, it was not error to not request the Court to define the term. 
Moreover, a "yes" answer would not have been accurate. As Crawford recognizes, 
genitalia consists of both internal and external organs. As discussed above, the vagina and the 
vaginal area technically refer to the internal organs. See OXFORD AMERICAN PAPERBACK 
DICTIONARY 1027 (1980). The external genitalia are "outside" the vaginal area. Outside is defined 
as "the outer side of a surface." Id. at 634. Therefore, the answer "yes" may have further confused 
the jury. 
Finally, because the victim clearly testified Crawford touched the "outside of the vaginal 
area." a jury could reasonably understand her testimony to be referencing the external genitalia 
which is what is required under the statute for a conviction. 
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1 Therefore, Crawford cannot prove either that the failure to request a definition of genitals 
2 or to request the Court answer "yes" fell below an objective standard or that Crawford suffered 
3 prejudice from that failure. In addition, the failure to preserve the issue for appeal did not fall 
4 below an objective standard. Crawford is denied relief on these grounds. 
5 II. 
6 
Allegations against appellate counsel fail. 


























sufficiency of the evidence supporting Crawford's conviction on Count II. He claims "[t]here 
were not stronger issues to raise on appeal." He is wrong. 
Claims that a petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel because appointed 
counsel should have raised certain additional issues on appeal are subject to the standards set forth 
in Strickland, and Crawford therefore must show that his appellate counsel's performance was 
deficient and caused prejudice in the outcome of the appeal. The Court of Appeals succinctly 
noted that 
" ... [I]t is still possible to bring a Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to 
raise a particular claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was 
incompetent." "[O]nly when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those 
presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome." · 
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). 
Therefore, an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed 
appellate counsel to press all non-frivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to pursue. As the 
Court of Appeals observed "the process of winnowing out weaker· arguments on appeal and 
focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from being the evidence of incompetence, is the 
hallmark of effective appellate advocacy." Id. 
In Mintun, the Court of Appeals also recognized that certain issues should not be 
addressed in a direct appeal when the record on appeal is not complete enough to appropriately 
and adequately address the merits of the claim. Id. at 662, 168 P.3d at 46. Additionally, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to appeal decisions of the defense counsel 
regarding evidence or other potential errors is difficult to sustain because the record on direct 
appeal rarely discloses trial strategy and tactical decision-making. See Id. 
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Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal is a difficult hurdle for appellate 
counsel when there is some evidence supporting the conviction. The test of sufficiency is whether 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support a conviction. State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 192, 
197,610 P.2d 551,556 (1980); State v. Erwin, 98 Idaho 736,740,572 P.2d 170, 174 (1977). 
"Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to sustain the verdict, this 
court cannot reweigh that evidence or disturb the verdict." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 
644--45, 962 P.2d at 1028-29. 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004). In this case, as discussed above, 
there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
Evidence is substantial if a "reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been prove[n]." State v. 
Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 135, 937 P.2d 960,961 (Ct.App.1997). On appeal from a 
defendant's conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution in determining whether substantial evidence exists. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho at 286, 77 P.3d at 975. We will not substitute our own judgment for that of 
the jury on matters such as the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to 
certain evidence, and "the reasonable inferences to be drawnfrom the evidence." 
Id. (quoting State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996)). 
Accordingly, substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is 
solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. State v. Stevens, 93 
Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947-48 (1969); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 
704, 132 P.3d 455, 461 (Ct.App.2005). In fact, even when circumstantial evidence 
could be interpreted consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to 
uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt. 
State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753,757,864 P.2d 199,203 (Ct.App.1993). 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,712,215 P.3d 414,432 (2009) (emphasis added). 
The jury had the opportunity to observe the second victim's demeanor, her reluctance to 
testify or to even describe what had happened to her. She clearly testified that Crawford asked her 
"if she knew what her clit was." She also clearly testified that when she responded that she did 
not know, Crawford said, "Well, let me show you" and approached her to show her as she backed 
away. She testified he touched her "outside of her vaginal area." 
As discussed above, the evidence gave rise to reasonable inferences of guilt on Count II. 
Thus, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue this issue on appeal. Appellate 
counsel raised the strongest issue on appeal - that the Court erred as a matter of law in instructing 
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the jury. Significantly, appellate counsel convinced the Court of Appeals and the court vacated his 
conviction on Count I. 
Thus, this claim fails as well and the Court dismisses his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the evidence and pleadings before it, the Court finds that no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings and finds, as a matter of law, that Crawford is entitled 
to none of the post-conviction relief requested. Repp v. State, 136 Idaho 262, 32 P.3d 156, 157-58 
(Ct. App. 2001). Having reviewed the Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable to· 
Crawford, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Crawford is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
J.C. § 19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose 
' 
would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, the Court dismisses Crawford's Petition. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 12th day of November 2013. 
A ~ 
cI· ~ 
Ched C.~y  
District Judge 
,,. 
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